Let's be very, VERY clear:
The U.S. Constitution and the state
constitutions do not
authorize martial law. No way, en nunca forma, absolutely not.
Congress and for sure, the President cannot
declare martial law. That means,
“...no public official, and no officer of the Armed Forces, can invoke,
enforce, or act under color of it without thereby violating his “Oath
or Affirmation” of office.”
More
so, if they were to do so, violate their oath, they are committing an
act of treason.
Military officers; please, please, please realize that any order to
move onto the streets of America by any superior officer, by any
politician, is unconstitutional, null and void. YOU, should decline
and, if necessary, arrest that person!
That means that FEMA and other actions taken during Katrina were
illegal; they can administer help, but the use of force, the taking
of weapons, was totally an impeachable and treasonable acts.
View the video and/or read the attached article. Under the
constitution we had a model for emergencies and protecting ourselves,
a history of over 150 years of locally organized militia, as a viable
and proven way to involve local people when needed to defend, assist
in an emergency.
Thought the Statist, based on UN modeling, based on collectivist
model for governance that dominates around the world, the ideas,
principles and concepts as found in the U.S. Constitution and the
state Constitution's is unique, recognizes individual rights,
voluntary association and solutions solved by those affected, not by
external groups. This was demonstrated in the Chilean earthquake, in
Japan during the nuclear fiasco and other known situations where
cultures are self reliant. However, in the USA, there has been an
overt effort to take control via Stalisk, Hitlarian if not Maoian
models, all shown to have failed repeatedly, inefficient and
ineffective causing millions and millions of lives to be lost to the
stupidity behind the top down FEMA or DHA approach to 'helping.'
Wulirider
Read more below...
A
Primer on Martial Law by Edwin Vieira;
video
on Vieira on executive orders. From Constitutional perspective,
congress rules President and military depends on orders. Order
through force could be army, if civilian govt gone; then army would
act like police power. Gave
Civilian law superior to military law.
Constitutional sheriffs (Vieira) does
not appear in Constitution. Sheriffs not on same plain as federal or
states as they are mentioned in the Constitution. But the general
assembly does give them power. However, militia does is on the same
plain; and only time referenced in 2nd amendment; posse
comitatus is under their power, calling out the any able body under
emergency. Could be self organized around the sheriff's office.
(Insert sheriff article...)
“...Security of a Free State”
---2nd amendment--- and role of militia, complements local
control.
The people keeping and bearing arms
keeps a free state, self government. Mao said political power grows
out the barrel of a gun; 2nd amendment allows a people to
maintain a free state via militia. Constitutional structure is from
the bottom up, not the model now being used from DC, top down. Dc
creating a 1st class police state; given the coming
economic collapse and they do see this; DC is dong a top down
planning model and it will not work.
Organizing from a local perspective
WILL work. The main support pillar is the militia is necessary to
the security of a free state.
Keys
The
Constitution mandates that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government”
[Article IV, § 4]. By definition, “martial law” is not “a
Republican Form of Government”. For the “definition of * * * a
[republican] government is—one constructed on this principle, that
the supreme power resides in the body of the people”. [Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 457 (1793) (Wilson, J.)] And
“martial
law” derives its powers purely and simply from military force, not
from the people.
For that very reason, “martial law” is not any
form of “Government[ ]” that “deriv[es its] just powers from
the consent of the governed”—the only form of “Government[ ]”
which the Declaration of Independence allows in America. Thus,
perforce of this constitutional provision alone, “martial law”
cannot be imposed by the United States on any State. And if any
State attempts to set up “martial law” on her own, the United
States must put it down forthwith.
(i)
Congress cannot authorize “martial
law” by dint of any of its express powers, because no such express
power can be found in the Constitution. Congress cannot do it by
dint of an implied power, either. For, although Congress does
have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers [Article
I, § 8, cl. 18], none of its enumerated powers relates to “martial
law”—and therefore no implied power can be exercised in relation
to that subject. In any event, Congress can enact only “Laws”
pursuant to both its express and its implied powers; and no mere
“Law[ ]” can override the Constitution.
(ii)
Neither can the President
authorize “martial law”. Although the President is
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States” [Article II, § 2, cl. 1], in that
capacity or any other he has no authority to make any “Laws of the
United States”, or to set aside or suspend any of the “Laws”
then in existence (unless perhaps those “Laws” themselves so
provide). Rather, his constitutional duty is to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed” [Article II, § 3]. So, if no
“Law[ ]” allowing “martial law” exists, the duty to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” requires the President
to refrain from any involvement whatsoever with “martial law”,
except to prevent anyone else from attempting to impose it.
(iii)
The President enjoys no greater power to impose “martial law” by
combining with the Senate “to make Treaties” [Article II, § 2,
cl. 2]. For, as noted above, “Treaties” cannot set aside or
suspend the Constitution.
So,
unless “martial law” is authorized by the Constitution itself,
or by some constitutional “Laws of the United States” or
constitutional “Treaties”, precisely to set aside or suspend the
Constitution, then no public official, and no officer of the Armed
Forces, can invoke, enforce, or act under color of it without
thereby violating his “Oath or Affirmation” of office.
Such
an action by the President, et al, it would be treasonable.
-
A
PRIMER ON “MARTIAL LAW”
By Dr.
Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D.
August 31, 2009
NewsWithViews.com
It
is difficult these days not to come upon some pessimistic patriotic
commentator expressing the fear that something called “martial law”
may soon be imposed on this country, as the General Government’s
response to a new “terrorist attack”, or to the economic and
social chaos arising out of a collapse of the monetary and banking
systems, or to some other dire event that frightens hapless Americans
into trading a sure and certain loss of their liberties for a dollop
of conjectural safety.
An
optimistic patriot might scoff at such fears. But both pessimists and
optimists typically share the same implicit first premise: namely,
that the form of “martial law” they have in mind is legitimate.
Most of the time, this is a rather glaring and dangerous error.
In
legal analysis, definitions of terms make all the difference. And
“martial law” can be defined in at least four ways:
·First,
the term could denote the law that Congress may enact for governance
of the Armed Forces and “the Militia of the several States”. This
kind of “martial law” is plainly legitimate, because the
Constitution delegates to Congress the powers “[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” and
“[t]o provide * * * for governing such Part of the[ Militia of the
several States] as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States, respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress”. [U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls.
14 and 16.] With respect to “the land and naval Forces” such
“martial law” applies at all times. With respect to the Militia,
it applies only when the latter have been “call[ed] forth * * * to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions”. [U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.] With
respect to everyone else, though, it applies not at all.
This absolute separation the Fifth Amendment confirms: “No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger”. “Martial law”
(in this first sense), which may (but need not necessarily) dispense
with “Grand Jur[ies]”, applies only to “the land and naval
forces” and to the Militia in time of “War” (“repel[ling]
Invasions”) or “public danger” (“execut[ing] the Laws of the
Union” and “suppress[ing] Insurrections”), and to no one else.
It
would be clearer, though, not to describe these matters as involving
“martial law, but instead to refer to them with particularity (as
the Constitution does) as, say, “rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces” and “rules for governing
part of the Militia under certain conditions”. Then their
application only to individuals in the Armed Forces (at all times and
everywhere) and in the Militia (when “call[ed] forth” for the
three constitutional purposes)—and
their inapplicability to anyone else at any time, anywhere, for any
reason—would
immediately and always be beyond cavil.
·Second,
the term “martial law” may denote the direct control of civilians
by military personnel operating in those territories where civilians
are present, but no effective (or even any) civilian government
exists. For example, during a war, in the front lines and rear
echelons, as well as in places in the immediate vicinity where no
actual fighting with the enemy may be going on, but the civilian
authorities have been destroyed or driven out as a consequence of
previous fighting. Or, after some huge natural disaster, mammoth
industrial accident, or “terrorists’ strike”, across a wide
area in which every important civilian administration has been
rendered inoperative. The justification for “martial law” in
these cases is that, if the enforcement of civilian law is well-nigh
impossible, some other form of order must be set up for the benefit
of the civilians themselves who cannot be evacuated. To be sure, in a
zone of military operations, crimes such as espionage, sabotage,
banditry, looting, and otherwise terrorizing civilians have to be
detected, tried, and punished as quickly as possible. But in the case
of many (and probably most) other crimes, civilian suspects could
simply be arrested and be held for later trial in civilian courts,
under civilian law. And military personnel could perform the
essentially “police” functions of detection, apprehension, and
detention in keeping with the procedures and safeguards of civilian
law, too.
·Third,
the term “martial law” may denote outright military control of
some area in which military personnel simply suppress the local
civilian authorities and dictate to civilians under the threat of
main force. Whether or not the military personnel are following some
specific “code of military law”, “martial law” in this sense
purports to set aside the Constitution and all of the other “Laws
of the Union” and to substitute therefore the orders of officers in
the Armed Forces. And any civilian who violates these orders—even
if he is acting pursuant to the Constitution and other “Laws of the
Union”—may be punished, perhaps unto death itself. Although many
Americans might acquiesce in “martial law” of this variety if it
were the only available and unavoidable response to an actual natural
disaster, economic crisis, or other political or social upheaval of
severe magnitude, many other Americans fear that public officials
bent on usurpation and tyranny, on the pretext of some phony
“emergency” that they themselves have created, will deploy the
Armed Forces, along with various para-militarized
State and local police and sheriffs’ departments, throughout the
United States for the purpose, not of protecting, but of oppressing
common Americans. Obviously, neither public officials nor officers of
the Armed Forces can rationalize their imposition of “martial law”
in some geographical area by themselves destroying, driving out, or
otherwise suppressing the civilian authorities on the claim of an
“emergency” that does not really exist. Once “martial law”
has been imposed, however, a real “emergency” will exist—not
least of all in the inability of civilian authorities and local
residents to resist the oppressive forces occupying their territory.
So “martial law” in this sense can amount to a self-fulfilling
prophecy: Aspiring usurpers and tyrants in public office claim that
an “emergency” exists. They declare “martial law” and deploy
troops and para-militarized
police forces. The imposition of “martial law” creates a real
“emergency” of which average Americans have had no experience and
for which they are totally unprepared. The resulting destruction of
popular self-government rationalizes the maintenance of “martial
law”.
The
question, though, remains: Is “martial law” of this third variety
legal in America? The answer demands painstaking analysis of the
Constitution, which requires putting one’s self in the position of
Americans in the late 1700s so as to understand what they understood.
At that time, William Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England
was the most satisfactory exposition of the law available to
Americans. “[M]ore copies of the work had been sold in this country
than in England, so * * * undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution
were familiar with it.” [Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69
(1904).] Blackstone was highly critical and deeply suspicious of
“martial law”:
WHEN
the nation [i.e., England] was engaged in war, more veteran troops
and more regular discipline were esteemed to be necessary, than could
be expected from a mere militia. And therefore at such times more
rigorous methods were put in use of the raising of armies and the due
regulation and discipline of the soldiery: which are to be looked
upon only as temporary excrescences bred out of the distemper of the
state, and not as any part of the permanent and perpetual laws of the
kingdom. For martial law, which is based upon no settled principles,
but is entirely arbitrary in it’s decisions, is * * * in truth and
reality no law, but something indulged, rather than allowed as a law:
the necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing
which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be
permitted in time of peace, when the king’s courts are open for all
persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land. * * *
And it is laid down, that if a lieutenant, doth in time of peace hang
or otherwise execute any man by colour of martial law, this is
murder; for it is against magna
carta.
And the petition of right enacts * * * that no commission shall issue
to proceed within this land, according to martial law. [American
Edition (1771), Volume 1, at 412 (footnotes omitted).]
Patriotic
Americans in the late 1700s thought no better of “martial law”.
Here, the Declaration of Independence provides compelling evidence.
As the Declaration recounted:
The
history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove
this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.—
* * * * *
He
has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to
the Civil power.—
He has combined with others to subject us to a
jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our
laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:—
For
quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:—
For
protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders
which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States[.]
In
this litany of the most egregious aspects of “martial law”, the
worst is that “He has affected to render the Military independent
of and superior to the Civil power”—for , if that can be done,
then all the rest (and even more) will inevitably follow, inasmuch as
no one will have any legal recourse against whatever the executors of
“martial law” may choose to do.
No
American alive today can believe that the men who wrote the
Declaration of Independence, who acted upon it to separate the
Colonies from and to conduct a long and sanguinary war against Great
Britain, and who upon the strength of the Declaration then enacted
constitutions for their States and the United States ever imagined
that the powers to behave in the fashion of George III—powers that
he had used to bring about “a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same Object [that] evince[d] a design to
reduce [Americans] under absolute Despotism”; and powers the very
use of which justified the invocation and exercise of “the[
people’s] right, * * * their duty, to throw off such Government,
and to provide new Guards for their future security”—were among
the “just powers” that “Governments * * * instituted among Men,
deriv[e] * * * from the consent of the governed”. And no American
alive today can believe that WE THE PEOPLE in that era authorized the
States and then the United States in their constitutions to do what
the Declaration of Independence had just condemned as “abuses”,
“injuries[,] and usurpations” aiming at nothing less than
“absolute Despotism” and “absolute Tyranny”. Moreover,
what Americans believed and incorporated into their fundamental law
then retains operative force today. For if the Declaration of
Independence did not state the necessary and sufficient legal
principles upon which the Colonies became independent States, then
everything the States and their people did thereafter is devoid of
legal basis.
Perusal
of the Constitution easily proves the illegitimacy of “martial law”
in the third sense. “Martial law” of this type purports to set
aside or suspend the Constitution and potentially all other “Laws
of the Union”, upon the mere say-so of military officers (or of
rogue civilian public officials colluding with military officers).
Thus, “martial law” proceeds on the premise that it
is the
“supreme law” in this country. The Constitution, however,
declares that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”. [Article VI, cl. 2.]
And all public officials, including officers of the Armed Forces,
“shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution”. [Article VI, cl. 3.] So,
unless “martial law” is authorized by the Constitution itself, or
by some constitutional “Laws of the United States” or
constitutional “Treaties”, precisely to set aside or suspend the
Constitution, then no public official, and no officer of the Armed
Forces, can invoke, enforce, or act under color of it without thereby
violating his “Oath or Affirmation” of office.
Even
if “martial law” (in this third sense) were itself a “Law[ ] of
the United States”, it could not set aside or suspend the
Constitution of its own force, because no mere “Law[ ] of the
United States” can have that effect. Any such purported “Law[ ]”
would not be “in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” but in
derogation and destruction of it. [See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-180 (1803); Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436,
491 (1966); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877-878
(1975).] The same would be true were “martial law” purportedly
allowed under one or more “Treaties”. For no “Treaties” can
set aside or suspend the Constitution, either. [See, e.g., United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898); Doe v. Braden, 57
U.S. (16 Howard) 635, 657 (1863); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11
Wallace) 616, 620-621 (1871); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wallace)
211, 243 (1872); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Asakura
v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); United States v.
Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 208 (1926); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
16-18 (1957) (Black, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).]
Therefore, unless within the Constitution itself lurks some power to
set aside or suspend it, with no guarantee of its ever being
reestablished, “martial law” is utterly impossible, as a direct
contradiction of the Constitution’s legal supremacy. And no such
power exists. For example—
(i)
Congress cannot authorize “martial law” by dint of any of its
express powers, because no such express power can be found in the
Constitution. Congress cannot do it by dint of an implied power,
either. For, although Congress does have the power “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”
its enumerated powers [Article I, § 8, cl. 18], none of its
enumerated powers relates to “martial law”—and therefore no
implied power can be exercised in relation to that subject. In any
event, Congress can enact only “Laws” pursuant to both its
express and its implied powers; and no mere “Law[ ]” can override
the Constitution.
(ii)
Neither can the President authorize “martial law”. Although the
President is “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States” [Article II, § 2, cl. 1],
in that capacity or any other he has no authority to make any “Laws
of the United States”, or to set aside or suspend any of the “Laws”
then in existence (unless perhaps those “Laws” themselves so
provide). Rather, his constitutional duty is to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed” [Article II, § 3]. So, if no “Law[
]” allowing “martial law” exists, the duty to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed” requires the President to refrain
from any involvement whatsoever with “martial law”, except to
prevent anyone else from attempting to impose it.
(iii)
The President enjoys no greater power to impose “martial law” by
combining with the Senate “to make Treaties” [Article II, § 2,
cl. 2]. For, as noted above, “Treaties” cannot set aside or
suspend the Constitution.
(iv)
The Constitution does allow for “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus * * * [to] be suspended, * * * when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it” [Article I,
§ 9, cl. 2]. But this does not amount to a power to invoke or
execute “martial law”, because suspension of the writ has no
necessary connection with “martial law”, howsoever defined.
Suspension of the writ addresses merely one part of the civilian law,
licensing civilian authorities to hold a suspect without bail,
pending his trial. Although that part of the civilian law is
temporarily suspended, no form of military law is, or need be,
thereby substituted for it. Indeed, the Armed Forces play no part in
the process at all. Importantly, the conditions precedent for
suspension of the writ—i.e.,
“Rebellion or Invasion” sufficient to endanger “the public
Safety”—involve situations which advocates of “martial law”
claim justify it. Yet, even under in those situations, the
Constitution does not suggest the propriety of, let alone call for,
“martial law”, suspension of the writ alone being deemed
sufficient to protect “the public Safety”.
(v)
The
Constitution mandates that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government” [Article
IV, § 4]. By definition, “martial law” is not “a Republican
Form of Government”. For the “definition of * * * a [republican]
government is—one constructed on this principle, that the supreme
power resides in the body of the people”. [Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 457 (1793) (Wilson, J.)] And “martial law”
derives its powers purely and simply from military force, not from
the people. For that very reason, “martial law” is not any
form of “Government[ ]” that “deriv[es its] just powers from
the consent of the governed”—the only form of “Government[ ]”
which the Declaration of Independence allows in America. Thus,
perforce of this constitutional provision alone, “martial law”
cannot be imposed by the United States on any State. And if any State
attempts to set up “martial law” on her own, the United States
must put it down forthwith.
(vi)
Inasmuch as the United States cannot impose the third variety of
“martial law” in any State, and no State can impose such “martial
law” within her own territory, where in America could “martial
law” ever exist? Not even in the District of Columbia and in “all
Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be”, over which “Places” the Constitution
empowers Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever” [Article I, § 8, cl. 17]. For, even in those “Places”,
Congress may not enact arbitrary
legislation. As Blackstone pointed out, “martial law, which
is based upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in
it’s decisions,
is * * * in truth and reality no law, but something indulged, rather
than allowed as a law”. The very essence of “martial law” is
vagueness,
because no one can predict what orders military officers may
pronounce on the spur of the moment, or how they may interpret or
enforce them. Indeed, this very “flexibility” of “martial law”
its advocates typically commend most highly. “[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application”, however, “violates the first
essential of due process of law”. [Connally v. General Construction
Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).] So, even if “martial law”
were explicitly enacted into some supposed statute, it would
“violate[ ] the first essential of due process of law”, and
therefore be unconstitutional—hardly a surprising result, though,
given that “martial law * * * is * * * in truth and reality no law”
at all.
(vii)
The essence of “martial law” in this third sense may be vague,
but its constitutional effect is pellucid: Any attempt to impose
“martial law” by force is nothing less than “Treason”. The
Constitution declares that “Treason against the United States,
shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to
their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort” [Article III, § 3, cl.
1]. And “if [‘War’] be actually levied, that is, if a body of
men be actually assembled, for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute,
or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually
leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors”.
[Ex
parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126 (1807).] In operation, “martial
law” proceeds by arraying men under arms in order to set aside or
suspend the Constitution of the United States, in whole or in part,
and to employ those arms against anyone who resists—without
any constitutional or other lawful authority for doing so.
Therefore, inasmuch as “the United States” exists only perforce
and through application of the Constitution, “martial law”
amounts to “levying War against the[ United States]”. And
inasmuch as WE THE PEOPLE are the authors and beneficiaries of the
Constitution, “martial law” amounts as well to “levying War
against” THE PEOPLE themselves. It would be immaterial that those
who attempted to impose “martial law” wore uniforms (even with
United States flags as shoulder patches), or held military
commissions, or acted pursuant to orders from supposed superiors.
Even someone who commits “Treason” under a claim of “good
faith” is entitled to no immunity. This principle is part of the
modern Law of Nations: “[T]hat the [officer] acted pursuant to
order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility”. [Charter of the International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg, Germany, 1945), art. 8.] And it subsists in American law
of a far longer heritage. [E.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13
Howard) 115, 137 (1851).]
In
sum, “martial law” in the third sense of that term cannot exist
in this country. It is a legal impossibility. Participation in it
would constitute the most serious of all crimes. And it would supply
just grounds for mass resistance among the citizenry aimed at
overthrowing whatever purported governmental apparatus attempted to
impose it. For, as the Declaration of Independence proclaims, under
such circumstances “it is the[ people’s] right, it is their duty,
to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their
future security”. And the Declaration of Independence is still very
good law in America.
All
that being so, who in his right mind would ever attempt to impose
such a form of “martial law” on America? Perhaps
no one. Yet Americans must be prepared for the possibility that
individuals not in their right minds may somehow insinuate themselves
into high public offices and the upper echelons of the officer corps
of the Armed Forces, and from those points
d’appui
seek to transmogrify this country from a constitutional republic into
a “national-security state”, a “garrison state”, or a
“para-military
police state”. It is not sufficient to contend that, insofar as
responsible people with well-balanced minds presumably outnumber
political psychopaths by many orders of magnitude, America has
nothing to fear. For that would be true only if such right-thinking
Americans were properly organized to meet the danger in the “well
regulated Militia” which the Second Amendment to the Constitution
itself tells them are “necessary to the security of a free State”.
·Thus,
analysis arrives at the fourth definition of “martial law”—namely,
when “the Militia of the several States” are “call[ed] forth *
* * to execute the Laws of the Union, [or] suppress Insurrections”
[Article I, § 8, cl. 15]. This would be “martial law” in the
sense that the Militia would be performing a “police” function in
a para-military
fashion, according to their training and discipline. Nonetheless, it
would be the exact opposite of “martial law” in the third sense
described above, because, in application to civilians, the Militia
would execute civilian
law (“the Laws of the Union”). Moreover, as the Constitution
plainly mandates in the generality of its language, when so “call[ed]
forth” the Militia would be required to execute all of “the Laws
of the Union”, including
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
both substantively and procedurally.
Besides
being undoubtedly valid, because the Constitution provides for it in
so many words, this form of “martial law” would never become
politically dangerous. For unlike “martial law” of the third
type, under color of which members of the Armed Forces would be
deployed to repress people they did not know in localities in which
they had never lived or worked, “martial law” centered on the
Militia would always involve in the forefront of operations local
Militiamen who could never be expected to oppress their own families,
friends, neighbors, and co-workers. Indeed, if the territory being
policed contained civilians, and least some of them would be members
of the Militia—and therefore to a large extent the Militia would be
policing themselves.
Unfortunately,
“[a] well regulated Militia” of the constitutional pattern does
not exist in a single State today. And none will exist until enough
Americans who want this country to avoid having to relive the
perilous circumstances that justified the Declaration of Independence
come forward to correct this deficiency.
© 2009 Edwin Vieira,
Jr. - All Rights Reserved
Pharisees
The
problem that Western elites (Pharisees, one could call them)
(Daily Bell article on Vieira...)
phar·i·sa·ic
(f r  -s  k)
also phar·i·sa·i·cal (-s-k l)
adj.
1. Pharisaic also Pharisaical Of, relating to, or
characteristic of the Pharisees.
2. Hypocritically self-righteous and condemnatory.
phari·sai·cal·ly
adv.
phari·sai·cal·ness
n. |
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth
Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in
2009. Published by
Houghton
Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.
pharisaic - excessively or
hypocritically pious; "a sickening sanctimonious smile"
zczczxczcxz
Daily
Bell: We've noticed the tribal areas that remain the freest –
or at least unengaged from global government – are the ones where
people are armed, like Yemen and Afghanistan. Is this coincidence?
Edwin
Vieira, Jr: Hardly. As Mao Tse-tung wrote, "'[p]olitical
power grows out the barrel of a gun'." Quotations From Chairman
Mao Tse-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, First Edition,
1966), at 61. The Second Amendment makes the same point, albeit more
idealistically: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Daily
Bell: Are the elites worried about sparking a guerilla war in the
West? Is this the reason for gun control?
Edwin
Vieira, Jr: The reason for gun control is to deny common
Americans the ability, and thereby the right, to live in "a free
State," because the Second Amendment tells us that "the
security of a free State" depends upon "the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms." You can't have the former without
the latter. And you can't attack the latter without attacking the
former.
Obviously,
the "elitists" must be extremely concerned with the level
of armament among average Americans, and how ill it bodes for their
schemes. If they push too hard, too fast, and too openly, some
hard-bitten Americans are likely to start asking their oppressors
point-blank: "Is enforcing the latest bit of bureaucratic
stupidity and insolence worth anyone's life?" And once the
shooting starts, all bets are off. Indeed, a betting man would
probably not give odds against 100 million or more angry Americans
armed with 200 to 300 million firearms and who knows how much
ammunition. (Especially if a sizeable part of the Armed Forces sided
with the insurgents.) Thinking about that possibility must keep the
"elitists" in a cold sweat at night. Of course, no rational
person wants any shooting to start. And the "elitists," if
they were rational, would want it less than everyone else. But how
rational are they?
Daily
Bell: Is it rational to believe that if martial law
came to America, that the country could be easily subdued?
Edwin
Vieira, Jr: Martial law" –
which is not "law" at all, but simply military force
applied without limit to the populace – will not "come to
America" until the country has been subdued. A "declaration
of martial law" is nothing but that, until it is enforced.
That's where the admonition "the Devil is in the details"
will be proven true in spades.
Daily
Bell: Best case – where is the US and the world headed? Worst
case? Are you hopeful? Do you foresee a freer civil society to hand
your children?
Edwin
Vieira, Jr: I foresee a great deal of trouble before this country
and the world exit the dark tunnel into which the "elitists"
have led us. Do you imagine that the Federal Reserve System's
monetary Ponzi scheme and the U.S. Treasury's gargantuan burden of
debt, utterly unpayable in real terms, will not be dealt with by, or
lead inexorably to, hyperinflation in the near term? And do you
imagine that hyperinflation will not result in economic collapse,
political upheavals, and massive civil unrest?
Out of all
this a free society may emerge. But, first, a lot of teeth will have
to be pulled from the vampires now parasitizing this country and the
world. And they will not sit still in the dentists' chairs for the
operations, I warrant. So I hope that my children turn out to be as
tough customers as the Finns were not so long ago. They fought Stalin
to a standstill twice, and walked away still in control of their own
country. That proves it can be done, if one wants it enough.
